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1MULTI-ISSUE BARGAINING UNDER BUDGET-CONSTRAINTS
Daniel Cardona Coll
ABSTRACT
We analyze a multi-issue bargaining model where the joint production of public goods is budget-
constrained. The players must decide the part of the budget that is dedicated to produce any public
good. We model the decision process as an alternating o¤er bargaining game with random proposers. The
utilities of the players are assumed separable in any public issue. We show that multiple sophisticated
outcomes are (generically) attained when a complete agreement is required for a subset of public projects
to be implemented, either if the players bargain globally over the sizes of di¤erent public goods or
sequentially through partial agreements. However, when public projects are immediately implemented
after partial agreements, then uniqueness (which is a necessary condition for e¢ciency) is generically
achieved.
Keywords: Multilateral bargaining, Sophisticated equilibrium, Issue-by-issue bargaining, Voting by
Quota.
JEL Classi…cation: C72, C78, D72.
21 Introduction
The literature on multi-issue bargaining usually considers situations where the players negotiate over
di¤erent goods of …xed size. These studies focus on comparing alternative procedures governing the
bargaining and how the speci…c extensive form a¤ects the outcomes. Two main results emerge from this
literature. First, if the bargaining proceeds by a sequence of bargaining games with players negotiating
separately on each issue then the agenda may play an important role in determining the …nal outcome.
The e¤ects of the agenda vanishes as players become patient when consumption occurs only after a
complete agreement is reached (see Fershtman (1990)) . However, its e¤ects persist if partial agreements
are immediately implemented (Inderst (2000)). Second, we learn that to achieve e¢ciency, the most
important issues must be put …rst in the agenda (see Winter (1997)) .
In these papers, the relationship among sequential negotiations is established through the impatience
of the players. If the players bargain sequentially (and separately) over issues of …xed size, a player will
be willing to accept a small share of some issue when she expects a high utility from the bargaining
game on next issue. The reason is that bargaining on next issue occurs only when there is agreement on
the actual negotiations. Thus, in such cases, this player behaves as if she is more impatient. This may
yield ine¢cient outcomes because of the impossibility of the players to make concessions across issues
so that the players may prefer to bargain globally than through a sequence of bargaining games. When
the players cannot consume their contingent agreed shares until a complete agreement is reached the
link between two (sequential) bargaining games di¤ers from the previous case. Now, players who have
assigned a higher contingent utility behave as if they were more impatient and are willing to concede a
higher share in actual negotiations to their opponents.
In this paper, we analyze a multi-issue bargaining model where another link among di¤erent bargaining
games appears. Consider a set of players endowed with some …xed budget, which can be used to produce
some public goods. Once the players decide to produce some amount of a public good, then it is not
excludable and there is no rivalry in consumption. Con‡icting interests may appear when deciding the
part of the budget assigned to the production of each issue. Since the budget is …xed, the production
of a public good of a given size will limit the feasible sizes of other possible public goods. Hence, the
bargaining consists of deciding the priorities of the public policy. I.e., the part of the budget which is
assigned to each public issue.
In contrast with the traditional analysis of the bargaining problem, two main features must be re-
marked. First, the set of feasible agreements is not necessarily any allocation of the surplus. The structure
of the problem we analyze imposes some restrictions on the set of feasible payo¤ con…gurations. Second,
the preferences of the players may be correlated, in the sense that some players may have the same
preferences over all possible priorities of the public policy. Fershtman (2000) considers a model where the
players may have correlated priorities. He considers a multi-issue bargaining model where the sizes of the
goods are …xed and agreement requires only approval of two players. He shows that if the priorities of
some players are negatively correlated, then the other player can exploit this in order to achieve a better
settlement. This result bears on the fact that meetings are bilateral.
3In our model, issues are related through the budget constraint: if the set of players decide to consume
a high amount of some public good, then this will limit the consumption on another public good. Thus,
if the bargaining proceeds by sequentially deciding the size of any public issue, a clear link is established
between actual decisions a future possibilities.
We model the decision process as an alternating o¤er bargaining game with random proposers: at each
period, a player is (randomly) chosen as the proposer. Once she makes a proposal, then the rest of players
simultaneously reject or accept it. If the number of acceptances exceeds some speci…ed quota q, then this
proposal succeeds. Otherwise, a new proposer is chosen. And so on. This model is quite similar to the one
where the players have outside options which depend on their valuations of the public issues (see Binmore
(1987)) if just two players are involved in the bargaining. For three or more players, multiple sophisticated
equilibria are sustained whenever the players cannot be ”polarized” into two groups according to their
preferences. In such cases, punishment threats can be sustained as part of the equilibrium strategies in
an in…nite horizon bargaining game, and this causes multiplicity.
As it is usual in multi-issue bargaining, we analyze two di¤erent scenarios in which the players must
decide the priorities of the public policy. A …rst environment where the players propose a complete vector
of priorities of the public policy; and a second one, where the bargaining proceeds through a sequence
of partial agreements over these priorities. These possibilities induce to di¤erent equilibrium outcomes.
Thus, the selection between global bargaining and issue-by-issue bargaining is not immune to strategic
manipulation.1 Moreover, the basic di¤erences between the models we consider are not directly related
to the disjunctive between global and/or partial bargaining. They depend on the period in which the
public projects are implemented. This distinction is meaningful when players bargain globally over the
priorities of the public policy but it is very important when the players bargain issue-by-issue.
In the …rst scenario, the proposals consist of vectors of priorities, which determine the part of the
budget dedicated to the production of each public good. This would introduce intransitiveness in majority
comparisons when the set of available public projects is greater than two. That is, the set of players
cannot generically be polarized into two groups according to their preferences over di¤erent outcomes.
This opens the door to reputation possibilities and multiple equilibria are generically sustained. Only
when the number of relevant public issues is two then majorities are “stable” and a unique vector of
expected weights is attained in equilibrium.
In a second scenario, we develop the idea of issue-by-issue bargaining (see Winter (1997)). The
proposals consist of the part of the budget dedicated to produce a particular public good. That is,
the players must agree sequentially over the sizes of di¤erent public goods according to some …xed
agenda, which determines the order in which di¤erent issues are considered. Using a backwards induction
argument one might think that in this framework, the players face to a sequence of bargaining games
1Although these strategic incentives are somehow di¤erent from the well-known problem of agenda manipulation, one
can found examples where such type of incentives are present. Recently, for instance, some EC countries tried that …sh
tari¤s were negotiated separately from other agricultural tari¤s in the recent World Trade Organization meeting in Seattle
(December, 1999). Finally, these pressures had no e¤ects and Brussels decided to include …shing tari¤s as part of the global
agreement.
4where just two issues are considered, and so uniqueness would appear. This is generically true when
partial agreements are not contingent to a complete agreement. This unique equilibrium is shown to
be dependent on the order in which di¤erent weights are submitted to approval. Therefore, the agenda
can play an important role in determining the outcome. On the other hand, if a complete agreement
is required for partial agreements to be e¤ective, then previous agreements a¤ect future equilibrium
outcomes (in some sense, the bargaining becomes global). This induces to a non-bipolar structure of
preferences in each subgame, leading to multiplicity.
In the next section, we present the alternating o¤er bargaining model where proposals consist of
vectors of priorities. We analyze the special case where just two public projects are available. The
uniqueness result we get in this case is very helpful in section 3 where the bargaining is modeled as a
sequence of partial agreements: we show that when partial agreements are not contingent to a complete
agreement then uniqueness is generically achieved. In section 4, we discuss the importance of uniqueness
in our setting, as a necessary property for e¢ciency. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Global Agreement Bargaining Framework
There is a …nite set of agents I = f1;:::;ng who must decide how to distribute a …xed budget of 1
among k di¤erent issues. Let K denote this set of issues.2 Each agent i is de…ned by a vector ai =
(ai (1);:::;ai (k)) 2< k
+,w h e r eai (j) denotes the i’s marginal utility of issue j.3 T h a ti s ,w ea s s u m et h a t
the players have additively separable utility functions.
The bargaining among the players is a version of the alternating o¤er discrete time and in…nite
horizon bargaining game (see Rubinstein [12] and Binmore [2]). At each period one player is randomly
chosen from I as the proposer, with equal probability each. Then, she makes a proposal x 2 ¢k¡1 = n




, and the rest of players simultaneously accept
or reject it. If at least q players accept x then this proposal succeeds and the budget is assigned according
to this vector of priorities. Otherwise, x is rejected and the game moves to next period where a new
proposer is randomly chosen.4We consider that the players observe only the outcome of the voting stage
so that their actions are not observed.
As we noticed in the introduction, a particular environment could be the one where a set of players
decides how to invest in di¤erent public projects. There is a …xed budget that can be used to produce
(continuous) public goods. The players must decide how to spend on di¤erent issues. Hence, they are
implicitly deciding how to consume of each public good. These public goods are not excludable and
there is no rivalry in consumption once they are produced. However, con‡icting interests may appear
2We assume that the set of issues considered by the distributive policy is exogenously given. In any case, our model will
a l l o wt og i v ez e r ow e i g h t( n o tc o n s i d e r i n g )t oa n y o n eo ft h e m .
3We will also refer to ai as the vector of characteristics of player i. By priorities of player i we will refer to the order
induced by these characteristics.
4So, we analyze bargaining games where a speci…ed quota is the consensus requirement for a proposal to succeed. See
Baron and Ferejohn [1], Harrington [8] and Cardona-Coll and Mancera [3] for an analysis of multilateral bargaining games
w h e r es i m p l em a j o r i t yi sr e q u i r e d .
5when deciding the sizes of the public goods which are produced. We use this interpretation of the model
throughout this paper.
Remark 1 Another interesting environment where our model applies is the one where some distributive
policy is made on grounds of some proportional rule. This could be the case when some central government
shares some budget to local governments based on their relative needs. Each agent has some exogenous
characteristics measuring her relative needs on di¤erent issues. Thus, once there is agreement on the
part of the budget dedicated to cover the needs of some speci…c issue, the players receive a surplus which
is proportional to their characteristics. An example could be when the European Union decides how
to share some …xed and divisible budget among its members: the decision considers the characteristics
(which measure their needs) of the countries a¤ected by the distributive policy; and proportionality to
these characteristics, each country receives part of the surplus.5 O fc o u r s e ,i nt h i ss e t t i n g ,t h es e to f
characteristic is restricted to vectors satisfying
Pn
i=1 ai (j)=1for any j 2 K,w h e r eai (j) represents the
relative claim on issue j that player i has.
The bargaining consists of deciding the priorities of the public policy: the players must choose the part
of the budget which is dedicated to each issue. They bargain over the values of the vector of priorities
x =( x(1);:::;x(k)) 2 ¢k¡1. When some x is agreed at some period t, then the utility that a particular
agent i gets is ui (x;t). The players are risk neutral. Because they may fail to distribute the surplus in
the …rst period, the time preference of the players may play a role. We assume that they have stationary




j=1 ai (j) ¢ x(j)
i
. Thus, rivalry appears in deciding the amount of each public good
but not on their consumption.
Consider the case where ai (j)=ai (l) for any j;l 2 K, and for any i 2 I. It is clear that in this case
there is no possible bargaining. The players will receive a utility that is exactly equal to their exogenous
parameters de…ning their preferences. Thus, there are situations where the bargaining has no sense, since
the utility pro…le is deterministic. Another degenerate situation would appear when there exists some
issue j 2 K satisfying ai (j) >a i (l) for any i 2 I and for any l 2 K, l 6= j. In this case, there is no
con‡ict among the players, who unanimously agree on x(j)=1 .H o w e v e r ,w h e n k ¸ 2, ai (j) >a i (l)
and az (j) <a z (l) for some i;z 2 I, j;l 2 K, the rules governing the bargaining can a¤ect the resulting
outcome inducing to di¤erent assignments of the budget. We assume that ai (j) 6= ai (l) for all i 2 I and
for all j;l 2 K, j 6= l.6
The equilibrium concept we consider is the sophisticated equilibrium.T h a t i s , w h e n t h e p l a y e r s
simultaneously veto or accept some proposal, then they do not use weakly dominated strategies.7 By
5The European “Compensation Funds” could be an example. There is also a …xed cuto¤ for a country to have the option
to receive part of these funds. However, the underlying setup can be considered as identical. Also, the usual negotiations
among EU countries on agricultural policy could be reinterpreted within our setting.
6Notice that the vectors of characteristics are exogenously given. If we consider that they are drawn from some smooth
distribution function which has full support, then the set of vectors with some components being equal has zero measure.
7As in Moulin [10], we use the term of sophisticated equilibria to refer to the subgame perfect equilibrium strategies
6modelling the voting stage as one of simultaneous moves with only the outcome being observed, we
introduce some type of stationarity in the model since the players cannot condition their actions to the
speci…c action of some player(s) at the voting stage. However, non stationary strategies are not excluded
yet.
2.1 The Two-Characteristics Case
In this section, we consider the case where just two public projects are available. Hence, each agent
i 2 I is characterized by a relevant pair ai =( ai (1);a i (2)). There is a recognition rule which selects
the proposer, each player with equal probability. This player makes a proposal (x(1);x(2)) 2 ¢ which
indicates the part of the budget assigned to each (public) issue. Notice that once x(i) 2 [0;1] is selected,
by feasibility x(j)=1¡ x(i) is also determined. For simplicity, denote by x the part of the budget
assigned to the …rst issue.
Given a vector a =( a1;a 2;:::;an) of individual characteristics, de…ne
r(1;2) = (r1 (1;2);r 2 (1;2);:::;rn (1;2))
as the vector such that 8
ri (1;2) =
ai (2)
ai (1) ¡ ai (2)
for any i 2 I.( 1 )
Since the proposers are randomly chosen at each period, without loss of generality (w.l.o.g.) we can
reorder the players such that
r1 (1;2) ¸ r2 (1;2) ¸ :::::: ¸ rn (1;2): (2)
De…ne ­+(1;2) = fi 2 I j ri (1;2) ¸ 0g and ­¡ (1;2) = fi 2 I j ri (1;2) < 0g.T h e s et w os e t so fp l a y e r s
(groups) have the property that players in the same group have the same preference ordering over di¤erent
outcomes (they have common interests). Denote by ¯ (1;2) the proportion of players in ­+ (1;2). I.e.,
¯ (1;2) = m=n where m = j­+(1;2)j2[1;n) denotes the cardinality of ­+ (1;2). Hence, ¯ (1;2) is also
the proportion of players preferring x over x whenever x>x. Next Lemmas provide some properties of
the preferences of the players that will facilitate the speci…cation of the equilibria strategies. To simplify
notation, we avoid the arguments of ri and ¯ through this section.
Lemma 1 If w 2 I with w · m (strictly) prefers x at the current period to x at next period, then any
j 2 I with j · w also prefers it.
Proof. Player w (strictly) prefers x to x at next period, so the next inequality must hold
xaw (1) + (1 ¡ x) ¢ aw (2) >±¢ [x ¢ aw (1) + (1 ¡ x) ¢ aw (2)] (3)
that yield a sophisticated outcome in Farquharson’s [4] sense. The sophisticated outcomes in simultaneous voting contexts
have been shown to coincide with the outcomes that result in equilibrium when the voting stage is considered sequential
(see Sloth [13]). However, in our context the actions in the voting stage are not observed, so that this equivalence does not
hold. For an extensive description of sophisticated voting see Farquharson [4].
8The de…nition of this value and posterior reordering of the players according to it, is convenient for the exposition of
the proofs.
7Let’s now consider some j 2 I, w ¸ j, and assume that she prefers x at next period to x at the current
period.
x ¢ aj (1) + (1 ¡ x) ¢ aj (2) · ± ¢ [x ¢ aj (1) + (1 ¡ x) ¢ aj (2)] (4)
This implies that
x · ± ¢ x ¡ rj (1 ¡ ±) (5)
Since rw · rj,t h i sg i v e s
x · ± ¢ x ¡ rw (1 ¡ ±) (6)
contradicting inequality (3).
Lemma 2 If w 2 I with w>m(strictly) prefers x at the current period to x at next period, then any
j 2 I with j ¸ w also prefers it.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of the previous Lemma, just with the di¤erence that now
ai (1) ¡ ai (2) < 0, and thus it is omitted.
Depending on the relationship between m;n and q we have di¤erent scenarios. For instance, in case
that q · n¡m and q · m (therefore q · n=2) any player can propose her most preferred weight (either
x =0or x =1 ) and this proposal being accepted. Therefore, the expected equilibrium share on the …rst
issue becomes m=n = ¯, being the expected utility of any player i 2 I
¯ai (1) + (1 ¡ ¯)ai (2): (7)
In this case, the players in each group do not need to concede to their ”opponents” in order to reach
an agreement. So, the usual trade-o¤ of the bargaining is missed when the majority requirements are
too weak. However, when stronger majority consensus are required for a proposals to succeed, then the
players may need to concede to their opponents in order to reach an agreement.
To give some intuition about the equilibrium strategies, consider …rst that bargaining takes place
over a …nite set of T periods. When no agreement has been reached at period t = T ¡ 1,t h e ne x t r e m e
priorities (x 2f 0;1g) will be proposed by the members of any group at next period. The probability
that x =1is selected is then ¯.F u r t h e r m o r e ,¯ coincides with the expected share (on characteristic 1)
at t = T, yielding an expected utility of ¯ai (1) + (1 ¡ ¯)ai (2) for any player i 2 I.
Denote by µt the vector of expected priority of issue 1 at period t (which is uniquely determined at
t = T). At period t¡1,p l a y e ri will propose (in case she is the proposer) xi








az (2) ¸ ±[µtaz (1) + (1 ¡ µt)az (2)];z2 I, for at least q players. (8)
9Notice that, given our generic assumptions on the vectors of characteristics, this value is uniquely determined.
8The Lemmas 1 and 2 indicate the cuto¤ for a proposal to be accepted by the players in any group.
From them, one can easily show that a player i 2 ­+ (1;2) (i · m) will choose
x
+
t¡1 (µt)=m i n
©






¡1 if q · m
rn+(m+1)¡q otherwise
Similarly, a player i 2 ­¡(1;2) will choose
x¡
t¡1 (µt)=m a x
©






+1 if q · n ¡ m
rq+m¡n otherwise
Therefore, given (9) and (10)
µt¡1 = ¯ ¢ x+
t¡1 (µt)+( 1¡ ¯)x¡
t¡1 (µt) (11)
Using the previous equation, we can recursively …nd (with µT = ¯) a unique µ1 as a function of
T;r+ (q);r ¡ (q) and ± in the …nite horizon game.
Notice also that (for the in…nite horizon game) any stationary equilibrium vector of expected weights µe




t (µe). In fact, one can show that there exists a unique sophisticated
equilibrium in the in…nite horizon game which coincides with the stationary equilibrium.
Proposition 3 If just two public goods are available, then there exists (generically) a unique sophisticated
equilibrium.
Proof. Let µ and µ denote the minimal and maximal expected values of x in any equilibrium. Since
µ is the highest expected share assigned to issue 1, (by using Lemma 1 and Lemma 2)n op l a y e ri n






will be accepted for sure by players in
­+ (1;2).10 This implies that
µ · ¯ ¢ x+ ¡
µ
¢





µ ¸ ¯ ¢ x+ (µ)+( 1¡ ¯) ¢ x¡ (µ) (13)
where x+ (µ)=m i nf±µ ¡ r+(q)[1¡ ±];1g and x¡ (µ)=m a xf±µ ¡ r¡ (q)[1¡ ±];0g.
10This is true if we consider that only the outcome of the voting stage is made public, and players use non (weakly)
dominated strategies. As usual, notice that in equilibrium, an individual that is indi¤erent between continuation and the
proposed share must accept the proposal.




chosen with probability ¯ and x¡ ¡
µ
¢
with probability (1 ¡ ¯).T h e r e f o r e ,µ is not the maximal expected
value for x in any equilibrium, which is a contradiction. Similarly, (13) must hold with equality.
De…ne the function h :[ 0 ;1] ! [0;1] as
h(µ)=¯ ¢ x+ (µ)+( 1¡ ¯) ¢ x¡(µ):





= µ and h(µ)=µ.( 1 4 )
The function h is continuous and increasing since it is a convex combination of two continuous and
increasing functions, ®+ and ®¡.M o r e o v e r ,s i n c e0 ·
@x+ (µ)
@µ
< 1 and 0 ·
@x¡ (µ)
@µ




< 1.A l s o ,h(0) > 0 and h(1) < 0: Therefore (by using a …xed point argument), there exists
a unique µ
¤ 2 [0;1] satisfying h(µ
¤)=µ
¤.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,µ = µ = µ
¤.
How would look like the equilibrium shares? Next example shows that the proportion of players in
each group can determine the expected shares on each issue when there exists some player in each group
having zero receiving zero utility from one issue.
Example 1 C o n s i d e rt h ec a s ew h e r et h e r ee x i s ti;z 2 I such that
ai (1) >a i (2) = 0 and 0=az (1) <a z (2):
and unanimity is required for a proposal to succeed.
In equilibrium, we know that
µ
¤ = ¯ [minf±µ




¤ = ¯ [±µ





That is, the initial proportion of players in each group determines the expected shares.
Even if the proportion of players in each group has an impact on the equilibrium expected weights,
the values of ri (i 2 I) are also important. Next example shows that µ
¤ depends on these values, and not
only on the proportion of players in each group.
10Example 2 Consider a unanimity bargaining game with rm > 0 and rm+1 = ¡1.I nt h i sc a s e ,
µ
¤ = ¯ [±µ
¤ +( 1¡ ±)] + (1 ¡ ¯)[maxf±µ
¤ ¡ rm (1 ¡ ±);0g];
and therefore,
µ
¤ · ¯ ¡ rm (1 ¡ ±) <¯ :
That is, the fact that am+1 (1) = 0 and am (2) > 0 produces such vector of expected weights.
Remark 2 One can easily show that the equilibrium expected share on issue 1, µ
¤,i s( w e a k l y )d e c r e a s i n g
in rj; for j · m and (weakly) increasing in ¯ and rk; where k ¸ m+1 . Therefore, any player in ­+ (1;2)
would bene…t from the existence of another player i i nt h es a m eg r o u ph a v i n gai (2) = 0.
2.2 More than Two Characteristics
The important property of the two-issue bargaining game is that for any three alternatives majorities are
stable (in the sense that the players in the same group have the same preference ordering over di¤erent
outcomes). When there are more than two issues this ”stability” rarely appears. Given some vectors
of three characteristics, majorities can be unstable when we consider the preferences of the players over
the triplets (1;0;0);(0;1;0) and (0;0;1). Moreover, two players preferring (1;0;0) can have di¤erent
preferences over convex combinations of the three extreme alternatives. As a consequence, it is not
possible to separate the players into two groups with common interests. This was not the case of the
previous section where the majority relation was ”stable”.
Of course, when the number of players involved in the bargaining are just two, again the preferences
of the players are polarized into two groups. Not surprisingly, a unique equilibrium outcome appears in
such a context, independently of the number issues (see Proposition 6 in Appendix A). We observe that
the minimal value of the agents’ characteristics (the minimal marginal utility) plays the same role as an
external option in the standard alternating o¤ers bargaining game, when it can be exercised by the player
who is the responder (see Binmore [2]).11 However, for more than two players, the existence of majority
cycles over di¤erent assignments of the budget induces to multiple equilibria for players patient enough,
as it is shown in the next (generic) example.
Example 3 Consider a unanimity bargaining game and let a1 =( :7;:4;:2);a 2 =( :1;:5;:3) and a3 =
(:2;:1;:5). The extreme payo¤s correspond to the vector of weights x1 =( 1 ;0;0), x2 =( 0 ;1;0) and
x3 =( 0 ;0;1); which assign utilities b =( :7;:1;:2), c =( :4;:5;:1) and d =( :2;:3;:5) respectively. We now
show that any interior point in the convex hull of these vectors can be supported in equilibrium for some
± close enough to 1.L e te =( e1;e 2;e 3) be a payo¤ con…guration in the interior of the convex hull of b;c
11By accepting the worst vector of weights, a player can guarantee this amount when n =2 . So, it is clear that in such
case it could be considered as an outside option. However, this relationship is not clear when there are more than two
players because of the unanimity requirement. Notice also that the uniqueness appears when the player who can opt to her
external option is not the proposer. Otherwise multiple equilibria are sustained (see Ponsatí and Sákovics [11]).
11and d,a n dc o n s i d e ry =( y1;y 2;y 3) and z =( z1;z 2;z 3) also in this convex hull such that e1 >y 1 = z1,
e2 = y2 <z 2 and e3 = z3 <y 3,w i t h
P3
i=1 wi =1 ,w h e r ewi denotes the i ¡ th component of the vector
w,f o rw = e;y;z and i =1 ;2;3. Consider the strategies “play e” given by:12
(i) Any player proposes e.
(ii) When e is proposed the players accept it.
(iii) If either 2 or 3 propose w satisfying w1 <± e 1 then e is played again whenever it is refused.
(iv) If 2 proposes w satisfying w1 ¸ ±e1 and w3 <± y 3 then y is played whenever it is refused (with
similar strategies to (i) to (v)).
(v) If 3 proposes w satisfying w1 ¸ ±e1 and w2 <± z 2 then z is played if it is refused (with similar
strategies to (i) to (vi)).
(vi) If 1 proposes w satisfying w2 <± z 2 then z is played and if w3 <± y 3 then y is played if it is refused
(with similar strategies to (i) to (vi)).
Notice that when ± is close to 1 then neither w1 ¸ ±e1, w3 ¸ ±y3 and w2 ¸ e2 nor w1 ¸ ±e1, w2 ¸ ±z2
and w3 ¸ y3 nor w2 ¸ ±z2, w3 ¸ ±y3 and w1 ¸ e1can be simultaneously satis…ed. Hence, the previous
strategies constitute a sophisticated equilibrium.
3 Issue-by-Issue Bargaining
Consider n players characterized by the vectors ai =( ai (1);a i (2);:::;ai (k)) for any i 2 I, bargaining on
how to allocate a budget of 1 among k issues. Again, they have to choose some x =( x(1);x(2);::;x(k)) 2
¢k¡1. However, the rules governing the bargaining are quite di¤erent. Now, these shares assigned to
each issue are chosen sequentially and independently (except by the feasibility restriction).13 We call
the j ¡ th bargaining round to the set of periods where the players bargain over the share (or priority)
assigned to issue j 2 K.
At …rst period the …rst round starts, with players bargaining over x(1). A proposer i 2 I is randomly
chosen, with equal probability each player. She makes proposal xi (1), and then the rest of players
simultaneously either accept or reject it. If at least q players accept it then a second round starts at the
same period with the players bargaining over x(2). Otherwise, the game moves to the next period, where
a new proposer is randomly chosen. At the beginning of the j ¡ th round there is a vector of accepted
shares (x¤ (1);:::;x¤ (j ¡ 1)) and a player z 2 I is chosen as the proposer, with equal probability each.
She makes a proposal xz (j) which can be accepted or rejected by the players, and so on. The shares that
the players may propose in each round j must satisfy feasibility, i.e. x(j)+
Pj¡1
l=1 x¤ (l) · 1. Denote by
¹j =1¡
Pj¡1
l=1 x¤ (l) the percentage of the budget which remains not assigned at the beginning of the
12The following set of actions does not completely de…ne a strategy pro…le. However, it is enough for our purposes.
13This idea of partial agreements is also developed by Winter [14].
12j ¡th round. The bargaining game ends once x¤ (k ¡ 1) is chosen, being x¤ (k)=¹k,o rw h e n¹j =0for
some j 2f 1;k¡ 1g.
We consider that discount occurs just when some proposal is rejected.14
Notice that using a backwards argument, we deal we a sequence of two-issue bargaining games: the
players must agree on the share assigned to one issue and the share left to continuation, which must
be assigned among other issues. So, one might think that this would restore uniqueness. However, this
strongly depends on the exact meaning of an accepted proposal.
By modelling the bargaining through a sequence of partial agreements, how these agreements are
implemented has a crucial e¤ect on the equilibrium outcomes. A …rst possibility is that, even if some
partial agreements have been reached, public projects are not implemented until all the budget is assigned.
In such a case, previous agreements can a¤ect the equilibrium shares of future issues because of the
impatience of the players in getting part of their (conditionally assigned) utility. A second possibility
is when partial agreements are implemented immediately, or in other words being non contingent to a
complete agreement. These two contents of partial agreement have very di¤erent implications: while in
the …rst case, past agreements have an impact on future rounds of bargaining, in the second case they
do not.
3.1 Non-Contingent Partial Agreements
We …rst analyze the case of partial agreements not being contingent to the end of negotiations. In this
situation, once they decide to assign part of the budget to some issue then they immediately get some
utility from the implementation of such public project. Next, they will bargain over the part of the
budget that remains not assigned. Thus, the “new” bargaining game has exactly the same properties as
the original bargaining game with the only di¤erence that the budget is (eventually) smaller and that
the heterogeneity of the players decreased one dimension. Except for these features, what happened in
previous rounds does not a¤ect the current bargaining game. Therefore, the utility of a player is now
given by ui (x¤;t)=
Pk
j=1 ±
tjx¤ (j) ¢ ai (j),w h e r etj is the period in which the players agree on x¤ (j).
Assume that the players have agreed on (x¤ (1);:::;x¤ (k ¡ 2)); and consider the subgame start-
ing at the (k ¡ 1) ¡ th round. In this subgame, the equilibrium expected shares are given by ¹k¡1 ¢
(µ
¤ (k ¡ 1;k);1 ¡ µ
¤ (k ¡ 1;k)),w h e r eµ
¤ (k ¡ 1;k) denotes the expected share on primitive (k ¡ 1) given
by Proposition 3, which results in equilibrium when the players bargain just over x(k ¡ 1) and x(k).15
Consider now the (k ¡ 2) ¡ th bargaining round. We can rede…ne the (sub)game as an equivalent bar-
14If we consider the discount factor as a measure of the impatience of the players, then just non accepted proposals can
a¤ect their subjective payo¤s. Notice that there must be di¤erent rounds at the same period (and obviously the same round
can take several periods).
15Notice that the normalization to 1 in Proposition 3 has no qualitative e¤ects on the outcome.
13gaining game with two issues, a(k ¡ 2) and b(k ¡ 1),w h e r eb(k ¡ 1) satis…es16
bi (k ¡ 1) = µ
¤ (k ¡ 1;k) ¢ ai (k ¡ 1) + [1 ¡ µ
¤ (k ¡ 1;k)] ¢ ai (k) for any i 2 I: (15)
Hence, at the (k ¡ 2)¡th round the players face to a bargaining problem over ¹k¡2¢x(k ¡ 2); which
uniquely determines the expected utility at the next bargaining round, which is equal to ¹k¡2 [1 ¡ x(k ¡ 2)]¢
bi (k ¡ 1) for any i 2 I. Since the players receive utility from any issue when the share assigned to it
is approved, they cannot a¤ect µ
¤ (k ¡ 1;k) when selecting x(k ¡ 2). So, the vector of expected shares
coincides with the one derived in Proposition 3, uniquely determined whenever bi (k ¡ 1) 6= ai (k ¡ 2) for
any i 2 I, which is generically assumed.
De…ne recursively
bi (j)=µ
¤ (j;j +1 )¢ ai (j)+[ 1¡ µ
¤ (j;j +1 ) ]¢ bi (j +1 ) for any i 2 I: (16)
where (µ
¤ (j;j +1 );1 ¡ µ
¤ (j;j +1 ) )is the unique vector of equilibrium expected priorities of the bar-
gaining game when just two characteristics of the players, ai (j) and bi (j +1 ) , are considered. At each
bargaining round j, the preferences of the players are polarized over x(j)=¹j and/or x(j)=0(which
equals to assign ¹j to continuation). Consequently, Proposition 3 can be inductively applied yielding
next result.
Proposition 4 The bargaining game with sequential non contingent partial agreements has generically
a unique sophisticated equilibrium.
This uniqueness result uses the fact that the order in which the players bargain over the priorities of
the public policy (i.e. the agenda of the bargaining) is …xed. However, the agenda has a strong impact
on the equilibrium allocation, as is shown in the next example.17
Example 4 Consider a unanimity bargaining game with a1 =( 4 ;2;1), a2 =( 4 ;5;3) and a3 =( 2 ;3;6).
Assume that the players bargain …rst on x(1). Direct computations show that in equilibrium x¤ (1) =
82=117, x¤ (2) = (35=117)(5=6) and x¤ (2) = (35=117)(1=6). If the players must choose …rst x(2),t h e n
we have that in equilibrium x¤ (1) tends to 1 as ± goes to 1. And …nally, if the players …rst bargain over
x(3), the shares converge to x¤ (1) = (19=20)(1=3), x¤ (2) = (19=20)(2=3) and x¤ (1) = 1=20 as players
become patient.
3.2 Contingent Partial Agreements
The case where partial agreements are contingent to a complete agreement enters a new feature: the
impatience of the players introduces a relationship between past decisions and future equilibria outcomes.
16By de…ning this ”new” characteristic, we observe the exact relationship between the marginal utility of the issue
considered at this round and the marginal utility of continuation.
17The e¤ects of the agenda on the equilibrium outcomes have been extensively analyzed in voting contexts (see Moulin
[10]). Ferejohn et al. [5] analyze a special legislative environment where such agenda has no e¤ects on the …nal outcome.
See also Fershtman [6].
14Now, the bargaining over the share of some speci…c issue is not only a¤ected by future assignments of the
budget, but also depends on how some priorities have been assigned to other issues. A player who obtained
a high contingent utility through previous partial agreements behaves as if she was more impatient than
a player who obtained a smaller contingent utility. Consequently, the inductive argument of the previous
section, which bears on the fact that future agreements do not depend on actual decisions, cannot be
used to analyze the problem.18
Since the players cannot consume their agreed upon shares until the agreement is global, we have
that (as in section 2) the utility of the players is given by ui =
Pk
j=1 ±
tx¤ (j)¢ai (j) where t indicates the
period in which a complete agreement is reached, and x¤ =( x¤ (1);:::;x¤ (k)) denotes the agreed vector
of priorities.
Consider the (k ¡ 1)¡th round. That is, (k ¡ 2) priorities have been chosen and the players face to a
decision over the shares of just two issues. There is still (w.l.o.g.) a majority players, say m, who prefer
to assign all the budget to issue (k ¡ 1). However, the unique sophisticated outcome of the (k ¡ 1) ¡ th
bargaining round does not coincide with the one given by Proposition 3. Now, the shares assigned to
previous issues will a¤ect the bargaining at the current period.
De…ne by s =( s1;s 2;:::;sn) the vector satisfying
si =
gi + ai (k)
ai (k ¡ 1) ¡ ai (k)









A=¹k¡1.( 1 8 )
As in section 2:1:, we can reorder (w.l.o.g.) the players such that
s1 ¸ s2 ¸ :::: ¸ sn (19)
Using a similar reasoning as in section 3:1, one can show that given x¤ (1);:::;x¤ (k ¡ 2), there exist







c =( m=n) ¢ x+ (µ
¤











c ¡ s¡ (1 ¡ ±);0g,w i t h
s+ (q)=
(
¡1 if q · m
sn+(m+1)¡q otherwise
18Notice also that the genericity assumptions we make to avoid indi¤erences could not necessarily be satis…ed because of
the endogeneity of the actions.
19Now, equation (3) and similars in the proof of Lemma 1 become




+1 if q · n ¡ m
sq+m¡n otherwise
;
and where m denotes the number of players with si ¸ 0.20
One can observe the exact implications of the two contents of partial agreements that we considered:
while non-contingent partial agreements do not a¤ect the negotiations on future rounds, the expected
equilibrium shares depend (through gi) on how di¤erent shares have been assigned in the past when
partial agreements are contingent (now transfers among issues are possible).
Consider now the (k ¡ 2)¡th bargaining round. We know that at the (k ¡ 1)¡th bargaining round,
the expected shares are ¹k¡1 ¢ (µ
¤
c (k ¡ 1;k);1 ¡ µ
¤
c (k ¡ 1;k)) where µ
¤
c (k ¡ 1;k) is given by (20). We
can rede…ne the game as a two-issue bargaining game, a(k ¡ 2) and b(k ¡ 1),w h e r eb(k ¡ 1) satis…es
bi (k ¡ 1) = µ
¤
c (k ¡ 1;k) ¢ ai (k ¡ 1) + [1 ¡ µ
¤
c (k ¡ 1;k)] ¢ ai (k) for any i 2 I: (21)
Notice that bi (k ¡ 1) is a function of x¤ (k ¡ 2) because µ
¤
c is. Given x¤ (1);:::;x¤ (k ¡ 3), for every
x(k ¡ 2) we have a (not necessarily) di¤erent vector of rede…ned marginal utilities. Moreover, depending
on a =( a1;:::;an) the value of µ
¤
c (k ¡ 1;k) can either increase or decrease in x¤ (k ¡ 2). Therefore, the
players cannot necessarily be polarized into two groups according to their preferences over x(k ¡ 2).A s
a consequence, multiple equilibrium outcomes may appear in equilibrium.
Proposition 5 The bargaining game with sequential contingent partial agreements has not generically a
unique sophisticated equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix B.
As in the non contingent case, we still can reduce the utilities of the players to one dimension space
when we consider three primitives (using a backwards argument). However, these preferences do not
necessarily generate two unique stable groups of players so that reputation e¤ects can appear in the
model, leading to multiplicity. Di¤erent expected sophisticated outcomes are sustained because the
players can condition their strategies to past actions. By considering secret voting we still allow for the
strategies be dependent on who make a proposal. This fact is irrelevant if we have two stable subsets of
players since the situation is somehow similar to the one where just two players bargain with di¤erent
probabilities of being the proposer. However, in this new environment we can have majority cycles
over the priorities assigned to the …rst characteristic (the preferences of the players are not necessarily
single-peak with peaks at zero or one) and this allows to sustain multiple sophisticated equilibria.
4 E¢cient Outcomes and Uniqueness
In the previous sections, we have shown that when partial agreements are immediately implemented, then
uniqueness is generically achieved. On the other hand, when a complete agreement is required for the
20Notice that m is not a¤ecte by the gi’s.
16implementation of the public projects, then multiple sophisticated outcomes are sustained in equilibrium.
Moreover, multiplicity is a consequence of the players using non-stationary equilibrium strategies. In
this setup, it is not di¢cult to see that ine¢ciency is associated to this multiplicity. The ine¢ciency
may appear because of delays in reaching an agreement. On the other hand, when agreements are non
contingent, uniqueness implies that there is no delay. Thus, one could thing that this would imply
e¢ciency. However, another type of ine¢ciency may appear because the players may assign ine¢ciently
the shares among di¤erent issues. The reason is that utility transfers among di¤erent issues are not
possible.
To see how this ine¢ciency may appear, we are going to consider a three-issue bargaining game with
two groups of quite homogeneous players. Consider the situation where the players in group 1 have a
vector of characteristics satisfying
a1 (1) >a 1 (2) >a 1 (3);
and any player in group 2 is characterized by
a2 (1) <a 2 (2) <a 2 (3):
In this framework, we can have two di¤erent situations:
1. (a1 (2);a 2 (2)) >¸(a1 (1);a 2 (1)) + (1 ¡ ¸)(a1 (1);a 2 (1)) for some ¸ 2 [0;1].
2. (a1 (2);a 2 (2)) <¸(a1 (1);a 2 (1)) + (1 ¡ ¸)(a1 (1);a 2 (1)) for some ¸ 2 [0;1].
In the …rst case, an e¢cient outcome must assign a share of zero, either to the …rst characteristic or
to the third one, while in the second case, an e¢cient outcome must be such that x2 =0 .T h eq u e s t i o n
is that if there is any agenda that yields such outcome.
It is not di¢cult to see that, in both cases, a necessary condition to get an e¢cient SSPE outcome is
that the players negotiate …rst on the second issue. Additional conditions in the …rst case are,
µ13 ¢ a1 (1) + (1 ¡ µ13) ¢ a1 (3) ¸ a1 (2)
µ13 ¢ a2 (1) + (1 ¡ µ13) ¢ a2 (3) ¸ a2 (2)
where µ13 denotes the expected priority assigned to issue 1 when the players bargain over the share
assigned to 1 and assigning the remaining to issue 3. In such a case, the share assigned to issue 2 will be
zero.
In the second case, a su¢cient condition for the SSPE outcome being e¢ciency is that issue 2 is …rst
in he agenda and
µ13 ¢ a1 (1) + (1 ¡ µ13) ¢ a1 (3) · a1 (2)
µ13 ¢ a2 (1) + (1 ¡ µ13) ¢ a2 (3) · a2 (2)




















Figure 1: Figure 2:
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the conditions in the …rst case. Assuming that the players negotiate …rst on
issue 2; we know that µ13 is independent of x2. The point A is the vector of utilities where x2 =1 , while
B is the one where x2 =0 . Any intermediate point is the pair of utilities when x2 2 (0;1).T h u s t h e
su¢cient condition requires that all these points being smaller than (a1 (2);a 2 (2)).T h i si st h ec a s ei n
Figure 1. Thus, assigning a share smaller than 1 to x2 is strictly dominated for the two players. However,
in Figure 2 there is one player (player 1) who prefers to assign 0 to issue 2 while the other prefers x2 =1 ,
implying that an ine¢cient outcome (some point between A and B) is reached.
We observe that e¢ciency may be guaranteed in some (very demanding) cases, which share the
particularity that the issue which is not preferred for any player is negotiated …rst. In all other agendas,
the bargaining game yields an allocation which gives some positive expected share to all issues, implying
ine¢ciency. Notice that the second issue is not the worst issue for any player. Thus, even if we cannot
make a concluding statement, intuition suggests that to get e¢ciency we must put …rst in the agenda the
“less con‡icting” issues. A similar conclusion has been pointed out by Winter in a di¤erent setup, in the
sense that the more important issues must be put …rst on the agenda. Of course, the existence of such
an issue in our setting will make all our analysis trivial. However, it seems that in a more con‡icting
framework the idea of …rst bargaining on less con‡icting issues may be common in both models.
A very special case where e¢ciency may be guaranteed is the distributive policy framework. As we
notice in section 2, a special case of our model is the one were a set of players must decide how to share
a …xed and divisible amount among themselves according to proportional rules. The game is as follows:
the budget can be assigned to di¤erent issues. Each player has some relative claim on each issue which
is proportional to some objective variable (number of schools in her district, population, etc...): once
part of the budget is thus assigned to an speci…c issue, then players receive a proportion (indicating the
relative claim) of this part of the budget.
In this setup, we have that the set of relative claims on each issue add up 1.T h a ti s ,
Pn
i=1 ai (j)=1
for any j 2 K. This implies that for any vector of priorities, the utility pro…le belongs to the frontier of the
18set of feasible utility pro…les. Thus, when an agreement is achieved without delay, e¢ciency is guaranteed.
This is the case when partial agreements are not contingent to a complete agreement. Otherwise, delays
can occur in some non-stationary equilibria.
There are other situations were uniqueness guarantees e¢ciency. It is the case where the preference
pro…les are such that all feasible orderings are present. That is, any feasible ordering over extreme shares
of the budget (i.e., all the budget assigned to just one issue) is represented by the preferences of at least
one player. In such cases, any vector of shares must be e¢cient, since by rearranging this vector of shares
there must be always a player whose utility decreases. Thus, we cannot have ine¢ciency because of a
bad assignment of the priorities.
5F i n a l R e m a r k s
We have modeled the situation where a set of players bargains over the priorities that a public policy as-
signs to di¤erent issues. We have shown that if for an agreement to be implemented a complete agreement
is required, then (generically) multiple sophisticated equilibria appear. However, uniqueness is generically
achieved when the bargaining is ruled by a sequence of partial agreements which are immediately applied.
The results bear on the possibility (or not) of polarizing the preferences of the players into two groups,
so that for any three alternatives and any three players there are no majority cycles. Roughly speaking,
uniqueness appears because two stable sets of players over di¤erent alternatives can be formed in any
subgame.
In the framework we considered, uniqueness is a necessary condition for e¢ciency. Thus, in contrast
with two-person multi-issue bargaining games, we …nd that issue-by-issue bargaining (and not global
bargaining) is the bargaining rule that can achieve e¢ciency. In any case, neither issue-by-issue nor
global bargaining guarantees e¢ciency.
When a unique outcome is attained in equilibrium, the outcome has been shown to be dependent on
the order in which the priorities are chosen. Thus, the agenda has a crucial importance in determining
the …nal allocation. An obvious extension of our model would consider how this agenda is chosen.
Another issue that remains unexplored in the paper is the (possible inclusion) relationship between the
equilibrium allocations in the contingent and the non contingent partial agreements cases. Notice that
we have explored a particular bargaining model and show that multilateral bargaining through partial
agreements can help to reduce the set of equilibrium outcomes. However, this does not say anything
about the “fairness” of the …nal allocations.
19Appendix A
Let a1 =( a1 (1);:::;a1 (k)) and a2 =( a2 (1);:::;a2 (k)).D e n o t e b y ai =m a x j ai (j) and ai =
minj ai (j) for any i =1 ;2.T h e r e f o r e ,ui ¸ ai for any i =1 ;2.
Proposition 6 If n =2and k>2 then there exists an (sophisticated) equilibrium where only two
characteristics have positive weight. Moreover, in any equilibrium vector of expected payo¤s is the same.
Proof. Let denote by ei and ei the maximum and minimum expected payo¤ of player i in any equilibrium.











ei ¸ (1=2)[maxf1 ¡ ±ej;a ig +m a xf±ei;a ig] (23)
These inequalities yield ei = ei =1 =2 whenever either a1 = a2 or ai · ±=2 for any i.C o n s i d e r n o w ,
w.l.o.g., that a1 <a 2 with a2 >± = 2.I ns u c hc a s e ,e1 = e1 =( 1¡ a2)=(2 ¡ ±) < 1=2 whenever ±e1 ¸ a1
and e1 = e1 =( 1¡ a2 + a1)=2 < 1=2 otherwise. In any case, the expected payo¤ is uniquely determined.
Moreover, the players can choose weights only on the characteristics where the players have a smaller
a n dh i g h e rp r o p o r t i o ns u c ht h a t
®2a1 +( 1¡ x2)a1 = ±e1 (24)
and
®1a2 +( 1¡ x1)a2 = ±e2 (25)
where x1 = x+ (µ)=m i nf±µ¡ r2 (1 ¡ ±);1g and x2 = x¡ (µ)=m a xf±µ ¡ r1 (1 ¡ ±);0g with ri being
calculated considering the proportions ai and ai,a n dµ =( x1 + x2)=2.
Appendix B
P r o o fo ft h eP r o p o s i t i o n2 .
We prove the multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes by constructing an example which can be ex-
tended to an open set of initial characteristics. Consider the following vectors of characteristics: a1 =
(0;0:4;0:6);a 2 =( 0 :3;0:2;0:4) and a3 =( 0 :7;0:4;0).
Once the players agree on the weight assigned to characteristic 1,w eg e t






































if x · 2=5
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if x ¸ 2=5
This will yield, for su¢ciently players
µ(x)=
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
2 ¡ 4x
3(1¡ x)
if x 2 [0;2=5]
6 ¡ 13x
6(1¡ x)
if x 2 [2=5;6=13]
0 otherwise





0:466 ¡ 0:33xif x 2 [0;2=5]
0:4 ¡ 0:166x if x 2 [2=5;6=13]





0:266 + 0:166xif x 2 [0;2=5]
0:2+0 :33x if x 2 [2=5;6=13]






0:266 + 0:166xif x 2 [0;2=5]
0:4 ¡ 0:166x if x 2 [2=5;6=13]
0:7x if x 2 [6=13;1]
We observe that for any x 2 (0:2;1) there exist b x 6= x such that u2 (b x)=u2 (x).W e w a n tt os h o w
that there exist some values of the x that can be achieved as the expected equilibrium weight on the …rst
characteristic.




. We want to see if these weights can






















where xi (x) denotes the equilibrium proposal of player i (i =1 ;2;3) when the expected equilibrium





21Now, subindexes correspond with the initial ordering of the players.
21The equilibrium strategies which sustain such equilibria are such that the equilibrium expected out-
come will change from x to x when deviations are observed. These expected payo¤s are sustained by
strategies which are partially de…ned below.
Play x:
(i) Player 1 proposes x1 (x)=±x ¡ (0:26=0:16)(1 ¡ ±).
(ii) Player 3 proposes x3 (x)=±x +( 0 :46=0:3)(1 ¡ ±).
(iii) Player 2 proposes x2 (x) 2 [x1 (x);x 3 (x)] such that x2 (x)=x ¡ x1 (x) ¡ x3 (x).
(iv) If either player 1 or 2 deviate and the proposal id refused then we move to ”Play x”. If 3 deviates
and her proposal is refused then x is played again.
Play x:









= ±x +( 0 :2=0:3)(1 ¡ ±).



























(iv) If either player 1 or 2 deviate and the proposal is rejected then we move to ”Play x”. If 3 deviates
and her proposal is rejected then x is played again.





strategies constitute a sophisticated equilibrium. Moreover, the example we propose is generic since we
can construct such equilibria in an open set of characteristics.
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